Diferenciación Espacial y Zonificación Óptima by Hamoudi, Hamid et al.
Optimal Zoning… / H. Hamoudi, I. Rodríguez, M. Sanz Martín-Bustamante 33Estudios de Economía Vol. 44 - Nº 1, Junio 2017. Págs. 33-51
Optimal Zoning in Spatial Differentiation*1
Diferenciación Espacial y Zonificación Óptima
Hamid Hamoudi**
Isabel Rodríguez***
Marcos Sanz Martín-Bustamante****
Abstract
This study analyzes optimal zoning policy in a duopolistic spatial competition 
framework for both circular and linear spaces. A regulator is introduced in 
the third stage of the price-location game through a welfare function to model 
zoning preferences from firms and consumers. An equilibrium outcome is then 
found for both spatial configurations. When the regulator is inclined to favor 
consumers (consumer-oriented) both firms are restricted to locate at one point 
to serve the whole market. Nevertheless, when the preferences of the regulator 
are biased towards firms (firm-oriented) the zoning area is maximized, with both 
firms being located at the market boundaries. The equilibrium outcome confirms 
location patterns found in real life situations under a non-neutral regulator.
Key words: Zoning, spatial competition, welfare function, equilibrium results, 
industrial policy.
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Resumen
Este estudio analiza las políticas de zonificación óptima en un marco de com-
petencia espacial duopolística para los espacios lineal y circular. En la tercera 
etapa del juego de localización-precio se introduce un regulador que optimiza una 
función de bienestar que formaliza las preferencias de empresas y consumidores. 
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Se obtiene el resultado de equilibrio para ambas configuraciones espaciales. 
Cuando el regulador se siente inclinado a favorecer a los consumidores (orien-
tación al consumidor), ambas empresas restringen su localización a un mismo 
punto para atender el mercado entero. Sin embargo, cuando las preferencias 
del regulador están sesgadas hacia las empresas (orientación empresarial) se 
maximiza el área zonificada y ambas empresas se sitúan en los extremos del 
mercado. Este resultado ilustra ejemplos reales en presencia de autoridades 
reguladoras no neutrales.
Palabras clave: Zonificación, competencia especial, función de bienestar, resul-
tado de equilibrio, política industrial.
Clasificación JEL: C72, D47, D60, L51, L13
1. Introduction
In this study a regulator designing an urban area divides the space for two 
uses: an exclusively residential area for consumers (residents) and a hybrid area 
where consumers and firms may locate. The aim of the regulator when restrict-
ing certain areas is to provide a high-quality environment, reduce trouble and 
reduce local crime.
Cities and urban contexts provide many real examples of externality effects 
from firms on the rest of society. In some cases public intervention may become 
an internalization mechanism for negative externalities such as pollution or lack 
of residential space. Regulators may decide on the size of the restricted area de-
pending on different factors. For instance, historical cities with a well-preserved 
city centers sometimes introduce specific regulations for firms locating in the 
old town area. Authorities may seek to preserve quality space for residents and 
tourists in order to obtain political influence (i.e. votes from residents) and 
welfare gains. Furthermore, coastal cities relying on income from tourists may 
control the number and location of firms near the beach to keep it clear and 
prevent excessive noise or pollution. The location of shopping centers close 
to ring roads around big cities such as London or Madrid is a strategic choice 
which may be influenced by zoning restrictions. Many large cities in the world 
such as México D.F, Paris, London or New Delhi are using zoning as a policy 
tool to regulate traffic (i.e. restriction of car access to city areas or any other type 
of zoning). These types of policies effectively crowd-out firms through regula-
tion by forcing them to locate their activities in unrestricted areas. Zoning may, 
therefore, be a useful tool for urban design or industrial policies; nevertheless, 
it may have adverse effects when wrongly implemented. Thus, non-regulation 
and free entrance may be optimal in terms of welfare under certain assumptions.
However, when zoning is implemented authorities need to find regulating 
instruments (i.e. strategic location choices) which enable them to reduce harm-
ful external factors efficiently. Authors like Mills (1989), Henderson (1991), 
Miceli (1992) and Wheaton (1993) have shown that zoning may become an 
interesting urban planning tool. This study focuses on the design of regula-
tion in a duopolistic framework which includes a regulator with alternative 
political profiles.
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Spatial competition models provide strong insights to study zoning policies. 
One of the most widely extended models in this field is Hoteling’s (1929). There 
are two crucial assumptions in the original setup depicted in the model: i) firms 
compete in a duopolistic framework; ii) consumers are distributed uniformly 
along the market space. Both premises are too restrictive to explain certain 
equilibrium patterns –for instance: endogenous location of consumers–. Thus, 
Hotelling’s model and some of its premises have been reconsidered to encompass 
a higher number of location patterns.
On one hand, when the model is expanded to an oligopolistic competition 
framework to allow entrance of more than one firm a strong version of the 
minimum differentiation principle holds. In fact, Economides (1993) finds 
that equilibrium in location does not exist in Hotelling’s linear model when 
the number of firms is increased to three or more. The reason is that firms have 
a strong incentive to approach the center but no equilibrium exists where the 
whole market is served. When boundaries in the space location (i.e. linear case) 
exist, equilibrium ceases to exist. However, for the circular case equilibrium is 
reestablished as boundaries disappear under this spatial configuration.
Another strand of models is developed for the analysis of equilibrium 
outcomes under non-simultaneous location of firms. Neven (1987) considers a 
sequential entry of firms in a differentiated industry within a Hotelling model 
where firms choose location (product) with subsequent price equilibrium. His 
findings show that early entrants locate first, impeding later competitors to 
locate between them. Several sunk costs are identified corresponding to differ-
ent natural market configurations so that equilibrium may be found for two or 
more firms. The sequential entry competition dynamic is extended by Gupta 
(1992) to a more general framework by assuming perfect foresight from firms. 
By modelling a Stackleberg game for the location of firms Anderson (1987) 
offers an alternative explanation: equilibrium occurs with the first firm locating 
in the center whilst keeping higher profits than the rest. This outcome is coher-
ent with the entry-deterrent and monopoly solutions. Lastly, Pu-Yan Nie (2011, 
2013 & 2014) and Yang & Nie (2015) consider the influence of other variables 
such as search costs to explain location patterns –i.e. industrial clusters– in low 
transportation cost frameworks.
A regulator may be introduced in spatial competition framework by specify-
ing a third stage in the location-price game. Since authorities serve the interests 
of consumers and firms it is common to define a welfare function as the sum 
of surplus for both economic agents. However, we use a social welfare func-
tion formalized as a linear combination of the firm’s profit and the utility for 
consumers1 (Hamoudi & Risueño, 2012). This welfare function is interpreted 
in terms of the profile and interests of the public authority.
Research on spatial competition introduces the role of the regulator by 
focusing mainly on optimal firm location, regulated zone dimensions, pricing, 
land usage2 and social welfare effects. For instance, Lai & Tsai (2004) examine 
Hotelling’s linear city model with restrictions on the location of firms. They 
1 Such weighted approach was defined by Baron & Myerson (1982) whereas Armstrong 
et al. (1994) used it to describe a welfare function.
2 See Fujita & Thisse (1986). 
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show that maximum differentiation holds under Bertrand competition and social 
welfare is improved. Tsai et al. (2006) analyses how zoning affects the location of 
firms and the rents derived from land. Chen & Lai (2008) investigate the effects 
of symmetric zoning in the linear city, finding that firms locate in equilibrium 
at the extremes of the zoning area under Cournot competition. These authors 
conclude that introducing a regulated zoning area can be welfare improving. 
Matsumura & Matsushima (2012) study a duopoly model with restrictions on 
the location of firms. Their objective is to analyze the effects on consumer’s 
welfare. The model shown is related to the issue of urban sprawl in order to 
determine the allowed dimension of economic activities. Hamoudi & Risueño 
(2012) consider the effect of zoning regulation in duopolistic circular model 
with Bertrand competition where consumers and firms are situated in different 
geographical zones within a city. They show that the optimal size of the shop-
ping area depends on the regulator’s political profiles. Furthermore, Hamoudi 
et al. (2015) complete the analysis of the location of firms by studying different 
specification for transportation costs to establish an equivalence result for convex 
and concave transport cost functions. The authors show that only a concave 
specification yields equilibrium.
The rest of this article is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the circular 
model while Section 3 focuses on the linear model. In both cases, the model is 
first depicted in order to determine price-location equilibrium and under optimal 
zoning policies. Each part concludes with specific remarks on the effects of 
regulation over competition.
2. The circular model
2.1. The model
We study a location model where a regulatory authority is responsible for 
the design of an area within a unitary circular space. Any point in the perimeter 
of the circle corresponds to a number from the interval [0,1]. The southeasters’ 
point is 0 and we move anti clockwise from there. Points 0 and 1 will therefore 
coincide. The planner divides the circle in two regions: the first one is a com-
mercial area bounded by points v1, v2 such that 0 ≤ v1 ≤ v2 ≤1 / 2 3 where firms 
and families locate. The second one is the residential area where only families 
locate (see Figure 1). There are two firms located at x1 and x2  such that x1 ≤ x 2  
and x1, x2 ∈ [v1,v2]  selling the same good in the commercial area at prices p1 
and p2 respectively.
A continuum of consumers spreads uniformly along the city. Each consumer 
buys one unit of good and pays the cost of transporting the good from the firm’s 
location to her residence. The transportation cost incurred by the consumer is as-
sumed to be a quadratic function of distance. Specifically, the function is taken as: 
  c(di (x)) = b di
2(x), b > 0, i = 1,2 ,
3 Here, it is not necessary to consider 0.5 ≤ v1 ≤ v2 ≤ 1.
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where the distance di (x) = |x – xi| between location consumer x and the loca-
tion firm xi, is defined as the shortest distance on the circle between the two 
points x, xi.
Let s be the gross surplus for an arbitrary consumer, x. We assume s is large 
enough (s >> 0) to allow all consumers to buy. Utility for consumer x from 
buying the good from firm i is, therefore, given as: ui (x) = s − pi − c(di (x)) . A 
consumer purchases the product from firm i when ui (x) < uj (x), i = 1,2, i ≠ j .
The model is then formalized as a three-stage game (Fudenberg & Tirole, 
1987). In the first stage, the regulator chooses the optimum size of the com-
mercial area; in the second stage firms choose their locations simultaneously; 
in a third stage firms decide on their prices at the same time. The game is then 
solved by backward induction. Given the size of the commercial area, equilibrium 
outcomes are found to substitute in the profit function of firms.
2.2. Price and location equilibrium
The fact that the location space for firms is restricted does not alter the location 
of indifferent consumers4. Thus, the demand function remains the same as for 
the unrestricted space case, De Frutos et al. (1999). We can then proceed with 
4 An indifferent consumer, α buys from firm 1 or 2 so that; u1(α) = u2 (α).
FIGURE 1
CIRCULAR MARKET
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a change of variable: z = x2 – x1, where z represents the distance between both 
firms, that is, the difference between the chosen characteristics. The demand 
function is represented as follows:
  
D1(p1, p2,x1,x2,v) =
1 p1 − p2 ≤ −bz(1− z)
p2 − p1
2bz(1− z) +
1
2
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
− bz(1− z) ≤ p1 − p2 ≤ bz(1− z)
0 bz(1− z) ≤ p1 − p2
⎧
⎨
⎪⎪
⎩
⎪
⎪
In addition, demand for firm 2 is: D2 = 1 – D1.
Once consumer demands are found, the profit functions can be calculated using 
the following relation: Bi (pi , pj ) = piDi (pi , pj ), 
 para i = 1,2 j = 1,2 for i ≠ j.
The existence of Nash equilibrium in prices is guaranteed for any size of the 
market v and any value of z, since profit functions are strictly concave (again as in 
De Frutos et al., 1999). The solution corresponds to: p1
N (z) = p2
N (z) = bz(1− z).  
Consequently, the demand and profit functions can be written as:
  
D1
N = D2
N = 1
2
, B1
N (z) = B2
N (z) = 1
2
b z (1− z)
Proposition 1:
There is a unique Nash location equilibrium for any commercial area given 
by: [v1 ,v2], x1
N = v1, x2
N = v2 .
Demonstration: (See Appendix). ■
The perfect equilibrium subgame expressions for prices demand and profits are:
 
  
pi
N (v) = bv(1− v), DiN =
1
2
, Bi
N (v) = 1
2
bv(1− v), i = 1,2, v = v2 − v1
Remarks
In the circular model under zoning regulation, the location pattern satisfies 
the maximum differentiation principle: x1
N = v1,  x2
N = v2 . We observe that if 
v2 − v1 = 1 / 2 , the location equilibrium remains the same as in the circular model 
without zoning (i.e. De Frutos et al., 1999). Therefore, zoning half of the circular 
market does not affect the location strategies of firms. The intuition behind the 
maximum differentiation result is straightforward: firms locate at x1
N = v1,  x2
N = v2   in order to avoid competition and reap some spatial monopolistic rents.
The demands are equal and independent of the size v. Thus, zoning does not 
affect the structure of demand in the location equilibrium. Prices and profits are 
also equal to each other and they are increasing in v.
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∂p1N
∂v =
∂p2N
∂v = b(1− 2v) ≥ 0,    
∂B1N
∂v =
∂B2N
∂v =
1
2
b(1− 2v) ≥ 0 for ∀ v ∈ 0, 1
2
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
If the regulator chooses a large value for v, competition decreases. Therefore, 
if firms were able to decide on their location, they will always be interested 
in the commercial area to be as large as possible in which case, v = 1/2. On 
other hand, the regulator can force both firms to undergo more competition 
which could eventually yield to zero profits. Indeed, if v tends to zero, prices 
and benefits will also approach as both firms engage in Bertrand competition. 
Subsequently, zoning regulation can be seen as an industrial instrument to limit 
firms’ monopoly power.
Given that the location pattern in this zoning model still satisfies the maximum 
differentiation principle, the purpose of a regulator is to find the dimensions for 
a commercial area and an exclusively residential area.
2.3. Optimal zoning
Town planners take their decisions based on the interests of firms and con-
sumers and for this reason the objective function is usually defined as the sum 
of firm’s profit and consumer’s utility. In contrast to this type of model, at this 
point, we use an objective function for the regulator described as a linear com-
bination from profits (firms) and utility (consumers). This, therefore, allows us 
to introduce the possibility to formally represent the preferences of a regulator 
in terms of the weight attached to surplus from producers and consumers. The 
welfare function can now be written as:
W (v) = λ BN (v)+ (1− λ)U(v) .
Where:
· λ is the weight given by the regulator to firms. Thus, (1 – λ) accounts for 
the weight given to consumers.
· BN (v) = B1N (v)+ B2N (v)  is firms’ profit.
· U(v) = S − BN (v)+CT (v)⎡⎣
⎤
⎦ , is the surplus from consumers.
· S is gross utility from consumers.
· CT (v)  means total transport cost paid by consumers.
Total transport cost is then formalized as: CT (v) = I1 + I2
– I1 corresponds to total transport cost paid by consumers when they buy the 
good from seller 1.
– I2 is the total transport cost paid by consumers when they buy the product 
from seller 2.
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I1 = b(x − x1N )2⎡⎣ ⎤⎦0
α1N∫ dx + b (1− x)+ x1N⎡⎣ ⎤⎦α2N
1∫
2
dx;     I2 = b(x2
N − x)2⎡⎣ ⎤⎦α1N
α2N∫ dx
Where α1N ,α2N  are indifferent consumers in terms of buying from firm 1 or 
firm 2.5
We can then represent CT (v)  as follows: CT (v) =
b
12
(3v2 − 3v +1) .
· CT (v)  decreases as the size of v increases. The mixed location area for 
both consumers and firms is: ∂CT
∂v =
b
4
(2v −1) ≤ 0 , ∀ v ∈ 0,1 / 2⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ . When 
the regulator seeks to minimize the total transport cost for consumers (i.e. 
their disutility), λ = 1/2 in the objective function. The optimal size for this 
case is v = 1/2.
Utility for the total of consumers is given by: U(v) = S − b
12
−9v2 + 9v +1( ) .
· U(v) is decreasing and reaches a maximum for v equal zero. In contrast to 
firms, consumers are interested in a minimum size for the mixed consumers-
firms area which then turns into a single point, thus, v = 0. The price of the 
good is equal to zero for this value and transport cost reaches a maximum. 
Consumers pay a high price for transport cost but are compensated by a 
zero cost for the good. The intuition for this result is illustrated by the fact 
that consumers travel massively (i.e. underplay direct transportation costs) 
when a free good is offered.
Given the expression for the welfare function W (v) the following can be 
highlighted:
– When λ >1/2, the regulator favors firm’s interest over consumer’s.
– However, when λ <1/2, the opposite happens.
– When λ =1/2, we have a neutral case in which the same weight is given to 
both groups: consumers and firms. Furthermore, the welfare function for 
this case is depicted as:
  W (v) = 1 / 2 [S −CT (v)]
The optimal strategy for the regulator is given by:
  
vO = ArgMax
v
W (v),
s.t. 0 ≤ v ≤ (1 / 2)
5 Indifferent consumers α1N =
v1 + v2
2
,  α2N =
v1 + v2
2
+ 1
2
.  
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By substituting the expression for BN (v) yCT (v)  in the objective function we 
obtain the following: W (v) = (2λ −1) bv (1− v)+ (1− λ) S − b
12
(3v2 − 3v +1)⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
Proposition 2:
For 0 ≤ v ≤ 1
2
, the optimal size for the mixed firms-consumers area is given as:
  
vC
∗ =
vC1
∗ = 0, if 0 ≤ λ ≤ 3
7
vC2
∗ ∈ 0, 1
2
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
, if λ = 3
7
vC3
∗ = 1
2
, if
3
7
≤ λ ≤1
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎪⎪
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎪
Demonstration: (See Appendix). ■
Remarks
Note that zoning occurs in different ways depending on the bias of the regu-
lator, thus, effectively changing the spatial distribution of firms:
– If 0 ≤ λ ≤ 3
7
, the regulator is consumer-biased. Agglomeration is then obtained, 
that is, the location space for firms is reduced to a single point, vc1
∗ = 0 . In 
this case, competition among firms is very intense (Bertrand type) which 
implies the price of all products is close to zero. These factors clearly be-
nefit consumers as they can live in a larger area enjoying more welfare. On 
the other hand, in terms of industrial policy, the regulator allows only one 
characteristic of the good to be produced despite the possibility to produce 
two characteristics. In this case, we obtain the following results:
i) Total utility for consumers: U(0) = S − b / 12 ,
ii) The profit function of firms equals: B(0) = 0,
iii) The welfare function can be expressed as: W (0) = (1− λ) (S − b / 12) .
– If λ = 3 / 7 , social welfare remains constant and independent from the size 
of the commercial area. The regulator has no a priori preference on the 
dimension of the commercial area.
– When 
3
7
≤ λ ≤1 , the regulator favors firms because the value of v, vc3* =
1
2
 
is their preferred result. In this case, firms separate away from each other 
(i.e. dispersion), locating at the endpoints of the interval. x1 = 0, x2 =
1
2
. As 
a result, the regulator is supporting an industrial policy in favor of product 
variety. In this case:
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i) Total utility for consumers: U(1 / 2) = S −13b / 48,
ii) Profit of firms: B(1 / 2) = b / 4,
iii) The welfare function: W (1 / 2) = (1− λ) S + (b / 48) (25λ −13) .
We can observe that a firm biased regulator, (3 / 7 ≤ λ ≤1),  reduces total utility 
for consumers and improves profit for firms, U(1 / 2) <U(0) .
These results are represented in figure 3 by drawing the optimum size for 
the commercial area:
FIGURE 2
OPTIMUM SIZE FOR THE COMMERCIAL AREA
The horizontal axis shows the value of parameter λ whereas the vertical 
axis shows the value of parameter v. The thick line refers to the optimum size 
of the commercial area.
The optimal solution v*, supports the popular view on the effects of the 
behavior of the authorities given their preferences.
3. The linear city model
3.1. The model
As in the circular case, a regulator may restrain the production area to the 
segment (v1, v2). Inside this interval the location of firms is given by (x1, x2), so 
v
λ
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that 0≤v1 ≤ x1≤ x2≤ v2≤1.
6 Consumers also distribute uniformly among the linear 
city of length one [0,1] where the areas [0, v1) y (v2, 1] are only residential. 
Again, this model is set up as a three stage game. In the first stage, a regulator 
chooses the size of the commercial area. In the second and third stages firms 
simultaneously decide on location and price.
We can represent the model as follows:
FIGURE 3
LINEAR MARKET
Using a quadratic function for transportation cost defined as:
  c(di (x)) = b di
2(x), b > 0, i = 1,2,
where the distance di(x) = |x – xi| between the location for consumer x and the 
location of firm xi.
Thus, the indifferent consumer is: α = p2 − p1
2b(x2 − x1)
+ (x2 + x1)
2
.
Given the uniform distribution of consumers along the linear city, the results 
obtained for the regulated model are the same as in D’Aspremont et al. (1979) 
except for equilibrium in location given by: x1
N = v1 ; x2
N = v2 . The following 
results are derived in this context:
  
p1
N (v) = 1
3
b(v2 − v1)(2+ v1 + v2), p2N (v) =
1
3
b(v2 − v1)(4 − v1 − v2)
α N (v) = 1
3
+ (v2 + v1)
6
B1(p1, p2) =
b
18
(v2 − v1) (2+ v2 + v1)2, B2(p1, p2) =
b
18
(v2 − v1) (4 − v2 − v1)2,
In order to compare profits between the firms B1
N (v)− B2n (v)  is calculated.
6 Lai and Tsai (2004) comment on this type of zoning, nevertheless, they do not analyse it. 
In contrast, these authors, study the linear city model in [0, 1] by assuming the area [0, 
z) to be only residential. 
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  B1(p1, p2)− B1(p1, p2) =
2b
3
(v2 − v1) (1− (v2 + v1)) ≥ 0 if v1 + v2 ≤1
Given the equilibrium locations: x1
N = v1 ; x2
N = v2 , the firm closer to the 
center of the commercial area obtains higher profits. Under symmetric zoning, 
v1 + v2 = 1 firms obtain the same profit. The regulator has no a priori prefer-
ences for any of the firms since both are private profit maximizing entities. In 
turn, we focused on the study of optimal zoning for the commercial area in the 
symmetric zoning case where: v1 + v2 = 1.
3.2. Optimal zoning
The last stage of the game for given prices and locations in equilibrium is 
then solved. The optimal size of the commercial area is determined by restrict-
ing the study to the symmetric case in which v1 + v2 = 1, where v2 – v1 = v.
Equilibrium locations under this condition are also symmetric to the extremes 
of the market. The above obtained results can then be expressed as:
  x1
N = 1
2
− v
2
, x2
N = 1
2
+ v
2
, α N = 1
2
, p1
N (v) = p1
N (v) = bv,B1
N (v) = B2
N (v) = 1
2
bv.
Prices and profit, therefore, depend on the size of the area, v. Firms ideally 
prefer the maximum size for the commercial, v = 1.
As in the circular case, the objective function for the regulator is given as:
  W (v) = λ BN (v)+ (1− λ) S − BN (v)−CT (v)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
In this function λ, BN(v), S, CT(v), are respectively the weight given to firms 
by the regulator; the total profit, consumers’ total surplus, and total transporta-
tion cost which is:
  CT (v) = b x −1 / 2+ v / 2[ ]0
α N∫
2
dx + b x −1 / 2− v / 2[ ]α N
1∫
2
dx,
= b(3v2 − 3v +1) / 12
Notice that the expression for transportation cost here is identical to the 
circular city case. In this case, however, v ∈ [0,1]  implies that:
– CT(v) is decreasing for ∀ v ∈ 0,1 / 2⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ ,  is increasing ∀ v ∈ 1 / 2,1⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ ,  and 
reaches its minimum value for v = 1/2, thus, firms locate in the following 
points: x1
N = 1 / 4, x2
N = 3 / 4, for which CT (1 / 2) = 1 / 48 . This is an identical 
result to the optimal social value stemming from the unrestricted linear city 
model seen before.
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– The total price BN (v)+CT (v)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = b 3v
2 + 9v +1( ) / 12  paid by consumers  re-
aches a minimum for v equal zero:
 
∂ BN (v)+CT (v)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ / ∂v = b (2v + 3) / 4 ≥ 0 for ∀v ∈ 0,1⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ .
Due to the above argument, consumers are interested in the size of the 
commercial area being reduced to a single point, v = 0, which involves firms 
locating at exactly the same point: x1
N = x2
N = 1 / 2.  The price of the good is equal 
to zero for this value but transport cost reaches a maximum. Therefore, it is 
worth for consumers pay high transport costs since that will mean a null price 
p1
N (0) = p1
N (0) = 0,  for the good as in the circular case.
Given the expressions for BN (v) y CT (v) , objective function of the regulator 
is written as: W (v) = (2λ −1) bv + b
12
(1− λ) (S − 3v2 + 3v −1).
Proposition 5:
For 0 ≤ v ≤1 , the optimal size of for the mixed consumers-firms area is 
given by: 
  vL
* =
0, if 0 ≤ λ ≤ 3
7
7λ − 3
2(1− λ) , if
3
7
≤ λ ≤ 5
9
1, if
5
9
≤ λ ≤1
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎪⎪
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎪
Demonstration: (See Appendix). ■
Remarks
– If the regulator is consumer-biased (λ ≤ 3 / 7 ≈ 0,42)  and the commercial 
area is restricted to vL
∗ = vL1
∗ − vL2∗ = 0,  the endpoints of the restricted interval 
coincide with vL1
∗ = vL2
∗ = 1 / 2 . Firms subsequently locate at the same point, 
x1
N = x2
N = vL1
∗ = vL2
∗ = 1 / 2 . They engage in Bertrand competition, with null 
prices (p1
N (v) = p2
N (v) = 0) . Agglomeration takes place and minimum diffe-
rentiation in product variety (industrial policy) holds. By calculating,  and, 
the following results are obtained:
i) Utility for the total of consumers is: U(0) = S − b / 12 ,
ii) The profit function for the firms equals: B(0) = 0,
iii) The welfare function can be expressed as: W (0) = (1− λ) (S − b / 12)
 
– If the regulator’s bias (λ) takes some value between 3/7 and 5/9; the optimal 
size vL
∗  reaches a minimum in the lower end of the interval for λ = 3/7, and a 
maximum in the upper end for λ = 5/9, that is, for vL* (3 / 7) = 0 , vL* (5 / 9) = 1 . 
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In this case 0 ≤ vL* ≤1  is increasing, meaning that when λ is higher the value 
of v is larger. We then move from agglomeration to dispersion (from mini-
mum differentiation to maximum differentiation). When planner has more 
incentives to overvalue consumer, he assigns a value of λ = 1/2, the optimal 
size of the commercial area is reached for vL
* = 1 / 2 . In this case, U(0), B(0) 
and W(0) are given by:
i)  Total utility for consumers is: U(
7λ − 3
2(1− λ)) = S −
b
48(1− λ)2 (25λ
2 + 46λ − 23) ,
ii) The profit function of firms is: B(
7λ − 3
2(1− λ)) = b
7λ − 3
2(1− λ)
iii) The welfare function is: W (
7− λ
2(1− λ)) = (1− λ) S −
b
48(1− λ) (143λ
2 −118λ + 23).
– Finally, if the regulator is firms-biased, λ ≥ 5 / 9 ≈ 0,55 , then vL∗ = 1,  or identi-
cally, x1
N = vL1
∗ = 0,  x2
N = vL2
∗ = 1. The mixed consumers-firms area corresponds 
to the interval [0, 1]; firms can locate in the whole market and they choose 
maximum differentiation in terms of product variety. This corresponds to 
agglomeration when interpreted in terms of location patterns. Now, U(0), 
B(0) and W(0) correspond to:
i) Utility for the total of consumers: U(1) = S −13b / 12,
ii) The profit of firms is: B(1) = b
iii) The welfare function is: W (1) = (1− λ) S + (b / 12) (25λ −13) .
Similar to the circular model when the regulator is firm-biased and (3/7 ≤ λ 
≤ 1 the total utility for consumers decreases and U(1 / 2) <U(0) . Firm’s profits 
improve in this context: B(1 / 2) > B(0) .
We can represent these analytical results in the following figure:
FIGURE 4
LINEAR MODEL
λ
5/9
3/7
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Again, the optimal solution v* in the linear model, supports the popular 
belief on the behavior of the authorities.
The results for the optimal size of the mixed commercial-residential are 
the same for the linear and the circular model, as shown in the following table:
Circular Market: 0 ≤ v C≤1 / 2 Linear Market: 0 ≤ vL ≤1
Optimal Zoning
if 0 ≤ λ ≤ 3
7
, vC
∗ = 0,
if λ = 3
7
, vC
∗ ∈ 0, 1
2
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
,
if
3
7
≤ λ ≤1, vC∗ =
1
2
,
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎪⎪
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎪
Optimal Zoning
if 0 ≤ λ ≤ 3
7
, vL
∗ = 0,
if
3
7
≤ λ ≤ 5
9
, vL
∗ = 7λ − 3
2(1− λ) ,
if
5
9
≤ λ ≤1, vL∗ = 1,
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎪⎪
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎪
4. Conclusions
In this article we analyse spatial competition in a regulated market where 
consumers locate freely along the market space, whereas firms are obliged to 
locate in a restricted area. We study the influence of regulation on competition 
in a circular space and then extend the analysis to a linear space. This article 
contributes to the spatial competition literature by providing a framework 
to investigate the role the regulator plays on the location pattern of firms. A 
specific functional form to model the behavior of the regulator is interpreted 
in terms of the values of the parameters. Equilibrium results are then shown to 
highlight similarities in the behavior pattern of firms, regardless of the specific 
spatial configuration. Interestingly, a concave specification for transportation 
cost yields equilibrium outcomes.
This type of approach is fruitful from two perspectives. On one hand, equi-
librium for both different spatial configurations can be categorized in terms of 
dispersion/agglomeration. This interpretation offers insights for urban policy. 
Given the weights the regulator places on consumers or firms, different location 
patterns will emerge from the location and price behavior of firms. Zoning may, 
therefore, become a useful tool from the perspective of urban policies and city 
planning. This is particularly relevant given the increasing role of cities –i.e. 
smart cities– in the economies of emerging and advanced countries.
On the other hand, these results can also be scrutinized from an industrial 
policy perspective as minimum or maximum differentiation cases. A regulator 
may, under these premises, exert influence on the location of firms to supply 
key markets. Zoning may turn into a useful tool for industrial policies. The 
political-economy issue of re-industrialization may be analyzed in light of the 
regulator bias towards firms of consumers. As a consequence, the results obtained 
for both spatial configurations can be interpreted in terms of the redistribution 
of welfare. It is proved that a regulator influences location patterns of firms, 
affecting the structure of the market. In this respect it can be stated that strong 
competition is triggered in the consumer-biased regulator case whereas weak 
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competition arises in the case of a firms-biased regulator. For a neutral regulator 
we find moderate competition. These results contribute to establish theoretical 
support to understand the role of regulation in spatial competition.
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Appendix
Demonstration of Proposition 1:
Given the expressions for the price equilibrium profit functions; the Nash 
equilibrium locations can be calculated by using the first order condition: 
∂B1
∂x1
= 0, ∂ B2∂x2
= 0,  We obtain that x2 − x 1=
1
2
Since 0 ≤ v1 ≤ x1 ≤ x 2≤ v2 ≤1 / 2,  for any value of x1, x2, we then have that 
x2 − x1 ≤1 / 2  , so that the necessary condition ∂B1∂x1
= 0, ∂ B2∂x2
= 0,  is only fulfilled 
for locations: x1
N = v1, x2
N = v2 . ■
Demonstration of Proposition 2:
For clarity reasons, the welfare function is rewritten as follows:
  W (v) = b
4
(7λ − 3) v (1− v)+ (1− λ)(S − b
12
)
By using the first order condition we find that: ∂W
∂v =
b
4
(1− 2v)(7λ − 3) . 
Considering that this condition depends on the value of parameter λ, in order 
to determine the maximum a second order condition is needed: ∂
2W
∂v2
.
Taking into account that: ∂
2W
∂v2 = −
b
2
(7λ − 3) = 0 , we can deduct the follow-
ing results:
−If λ ≥ 3
7
⇒ ∂
2W
∂v2 ≤ 0
 the social welfare function is concave and reaches 
a maximum for v = vc3
∗ = 1
2
−If λ = 3
7
⇒ ∂
2W
∂v2 = 0
 the social welfare is constant which means it takes 
the same value for any value of v between 0 y ½. This means the maximum is 
reached for v = vc2
∗  so that 0 ≤ vc2∗ ≤
1
2
.
−If λ ≤ 3
7
⇒ ∂
2W
∂v2 ≥ 0
, in this case the social welfare function is convex 
and the solution for the first order condition corresponds to a minimum, so that 
a maximum is obtained for v = vc1
∗ = 0 . ■
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Demonstration of Proposition 3:
By using the first order condition, ∂W
∂v =
b
4
(7λ − 3)− 2v(1− λ))[ ] = 0  and for 
λ ≠ 1 , it is found that vL* =
7λ − 3
2(1− λ) . Assuming that the second order condition is: 
∂2W
∂v2 = −
b
2
(1− λ) < 0 . Given that: 0 ≤ vL* ≤1,  vL* , is the maximum of the objective 
function if: 
3
7
≤ λ ≤ 5
9
.  
–If λ ≤ 3
7
⇒ vL* ≤ 0 and
∂W
∂v ≤ 0 for ∀v ∈ 0,1[ ],  a maximum is reached 
for vL
* = 0 .
–If λ ≥ 5
9
⇒ vL* ≥1 and 
∂W
∂v ≥ 0 for ∀v ∈ 0,1[ ] , the maximum is reached for 
vL
* = 1. ■

